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Abstract. Reification is a standard technique in conceptual modeling,
which consists of including in the domain of discourse entities that may
otherwise be hidden or implicit. However, deciding what should be rei-
fied is not always easy. Recent work on formal ontology offers us a simple
answer: put in the domain of discourse those entities that are responsible
for the (alleged) truth of our propositions. These are called truthmakers.
Re-visiting previous work, we propose in this paper a systematic analysis
of truthmaking patterns for properties and relations based on the ontolog-
ical nature of their truthmakers. Truthmaking patterns will be presented
as generalization of reification patterns, accounting for the fact that, in
some cases, we do not reify a property or a relationship directly, but we
rather reify its truthmakers.
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1 Ontological Analysis as a Search for TMs
Deciding what to put in the domain of discourse is a fundamental choice for
conceptual modeling and knowledge representation. The things that are relevant
for our conceptualization of reality—those that we implicitly assume to exist—
are typically much more than those our language explicitly refers to. So, our
cognitive domain is much bigger than our domain of discourse [12]. For example,
when we say that John and Mary are married, our language only refers to them,
although we know that there has been a wedding event and that there is an
ongoing marriage relationship. It is up to us to introduce these further entities
in our domain of discourse, should we need to represent and reason about them.
Such process of making hidden entities explicit is called reification. Note that
the new entities do not originate from a generic decision to expand the domain,
but rather from a transformation of a language construct (typically, a predicate)
into a domain element (a “first class citizen”).
Reification is a standard technique in conceptual modeling and knowledge
representation. Classic examples are the reification of relationships [24,3,23] and
events [4,6]. But how to decide what should be reified? Recent work on formal
ontology offers us a simple answer: put in the domain of discourse those entities
2that are responsible for the (alleged) truth of our propositions. These are called
truthmakers (TMs for short) [17].
Discovering TMs may be not always simple, of course, and requires some
acquaintance with the basic tools of formal ontological analysis. Indeed, we can
see conducting ontological analysis as a way of employing some special detective
magnifying lens, which helps us in searching for TMs. Putting ourselves in this
detective spirit, the basic questions we need to ask to analyze a proposition P
are similar to the famous Wh-questions: What is responsible for making P true?
When and Where will P be true? Of course, the answers to these questions
depend on the kinds of properties and relations we use in our language. In
this paper we shall adopt a systematic approach to account for the various
truthmaking patterns (TMPs) associated to different kinds of properties and
relations. A TMP is for us a generalization of a reification pattern, which accounts
for the fact that, in some cases, when we want to ‘talk’ of a property or a
relationship, we don’t reify it directly, but we rather reify its TMs.
In the following, relying on earlier work [9,10,11] which will be revised and
presented here in a systematic form, we first focus on properties and their TMs,
distinguishing between strong and weak truthmaking, introducing qualities and
descriptive properties, and presenting a number of TMPs at different levels of
expressivity. Then we extend the analysis to relations, discussing the formal dis-
tinctions among them according to the ontological nature of their TMs, and pre-
senting the corresponding TMPs. Finally, we conclude with some considerations
on the practical implementation of TMPs in a conceptual modeling environment.
2 Properties and their truthmakers
We introduced the notion of truthmaking in a deliberately general way, saying
that a TM is something that is responsible for the truth of a proposition. Strictly
speaking, only propositions have TMs (they are the only truthbearers). However,
in the case of atomic propositions, constituted of a property (or relation) plus its
argument(s), we find it useful to see the TMs of such propositions as the TMs of
the corresponding properties or relations, i.e., as something in virtue of which a
property or a relation holds for certain entities; so, we shall talk interchangeably
of TMs of properties or relations (holding for certain entities), and TMs of
propositions. This move allows us to make distinctions among properties and
relations according to the nature of their TMs.
2.1 Strong and weak truthmaking
Let us consider first the TMs of properties (we shall focus here on atomic prop-
erties, excluding logical combinations of them). What is it in virtue of which
a property holds? Several attempts have been made by philosophers [17] to
formally account for what ‘in virtue of’ means. According to the mainstream
doctrine, the TM of a property holding for a certain individual is something
whose very existence entails that the property holds. The nature of such TM
3depends however on the kind of property, so that relevant distinctions may be
drawn among properties based on the nature of their TMs.
Consider for instance two propositions such as (P1) ‘a is a rose’ and (P2) ‘a
is red’, where a denotes a particular rose. The very existence of a is enough for
making P1 true, so a is a TM of P1. For P2, in contrast, the mere existence of
a is not enough for P2’s truth. What is its TM? A popular answer [17] is that
it is a particular occurrence of redness, that is, a particular event4 (intended in
the most general sense that includes states).
So, being a rose and being red are properties whose TMs are of a very different
nature. As we shall see, the latter is a descriptive property, while the former
is a non-descriptive property. Intuitively, non-descriptive properties account for
what something is, on the basis of its nature and structure; descriptive properties
account for how something is, on the basis of its qualities. However, to better
account for this and other intuitions concerning the different kinds of properties,
we need to go deeper in the nature of their TMs.
There is indeed another notion called weak truthmaking, introduced by Josh
Parsons [26], according to which a TM makes a proposition true not just be-
cause of its existence (i.e., because of its essential nature), but because of the
way it contingently is (i.e., because of its actual nature). Differently from the
strong truthmaking relation mentioned above, the weak truthmaking relation
does therefore hold contingently.
Let us explain the difference between the two notions by considering again
the example above. Suppose that a is red at time t1, and becomes brown at time
t2. According to the mainstream TM theory, the strong TM of a is brown at t2
will be very different from that of a is red at t1, being a different event that
is an occurrence of brownness and not an occurrence of redness5. According to
Parsons’ theory, however, the weak TM at both times is the rose itself: since the
rose changes while keeping its identity, it is the very same rose, in virtue of the
way it (contingently) is at t1 and at t2, which is a TM of the two propositions.
A weak TM is something that, because of the way it intrinsically is, makes a
proposition true; in Parsons’ words, the proposition cannot become false without
an intrinsic change of its weak TM.
So, whereas under the strong view there are two different TMs (namely two
different events), under the weak view there is only one entity, namely the rose
itself, responsible for the truth of the two propositions at different times.
2.2 Individual qualities, descriptive properties, intrinsic properties
We have seen from the previous example that the rose undergoes a change, while
keeping its identity, from t1 to t2. What kind of change? Of course, a change in
its color. So, as discussed in [10], there is something more specific than the whole
4 Of course, there may be many of such events. Each of them would be a TM.
5 Even if the color does not change, multiple strong TMs are necessary as time passes
by, since each occurrence is different from the previous or future occurrences.
4rose that is responsible for the truth of the two propositions: their minimal6 weak
TM is the rose’s color. Indeed, it is exactly in virtue of its color that the rose
is red at t1 and brown at t2 . This color is modeled as an individual quality in
DOLCE [2] and in UFO [14].
Individual qualities as weak TMs. Individual qualities (qualities for short)
may be seen as specific aspects of things we use to compare them. They inhere
in things, where inherence is a special kind of existential dependence relation,
which is irreflexive, asymmetric, anti-transitive and functional [14]. They are
directly comparable, while objects and events can be compared only with respect
to a certain quality kind (e.g., to compare physical objects, one resorts to the
comparison of their shapes, sizes, weights, and so on). Qualities are distinct
from their values (a.k.a. qualia), which are abstract entities representing what
exactly resembling qualities have in common, and are organized in spaces called
quality spaces; each quality kind has its own quality space. For instance, weight
is a quality kind, whose qualia form a linear quality space. At different times,
qualities can keep their identity while occupying different regions of their quality
space; they are considered therefore endurants in UFO. Quality spaces may have
a complex structure with multiple dimensions, each corresponding to a simple
quality that inheres in a complex quality. Typical examples of complex qualities
are colors and tastes, but we shall also consider mental entities such as attitudes,
intentions and beliefs as complex qualities, collapsing, for the sake of simplicity,
UFO’s distinction between qualities and modes [14, p. 213].
An important class of qualities are relational qualities, which, besides being
existentially dependent on the thing they inhere in, are also existentially de-
pendent on something else. An example may be John’s love for Mary, which
inheres in John but is existentially dependent on Mary. Another example would
be Mary’s commitment to marry John, which inheres in Mary and is externally
dependent on John. As we shall see, relational qualities typically come in bundles
called relators.
Summing up, individual qualities, which were introduced for different reasons
in DOLCE and in UFO, can be seen now under a new perspective, in their role
of weak TMs for descriptive properties. From the above discussion, it is natural
to say that an quality is what in virtue of which a descriptive property holds,
legitimating therefore the interpretation of ‘in virtue of’ in terms of minimal
weak truthmaking. Note also that, for the needs of ontological analysis, looking
for qualities as minimal weak TMs has a clear advantage over looking for strong
TMs: while negative truths are notoriously a problem for the strong truthmaking
view, so that it is difficult to individuate the strong TM of a is not red, it is
immediate to see that its minimal weak TM is its color, and not, say, its weight.
Descriptive properties. Let us now define descriptive properties more care-
fully. As a first attempt, we may define them as properties holding in virtue of
6 Space does not allow to discuss the notion of minimality in detail. In short, we assume
that an entity x is internal to y iff x inheres in, is a proper part of or participates
to y, and external to y otherwise. Then, if t is a TM for a proposition P, it is a
minimal TM for P iff no entity internal to t is itself a TM of P.
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is descriptive, while being an apple is not. However, some observations are due.
First, it seems plausible to assume that a descriptive property may hold for an
object x in virtue of a quality inhering in a proper part of x, rather than in x
itself. So, having a big nose counts as descriptive since it holds in virtue of the
nose’s size, while having a nose is non-descriptive since it holds in virtue of the
object that has the nose, which is not a quality.
Second, we should account also for descriptive properties that hold in virtue
of relational qualities. Considering a generic descriptive property holding for
John, there are three possibilities: First, the weak TM consists of just one rela-
tional quality inhering in John, as in the case of being in love with Mary ; Second,
the truthmaking qualities are distributed between John and an external entity.
This is the case of being married with Mary, which presupposes the existence of
commitments and obligations (and possibly love) inhering in Mary and depend-
ing on John, as well as reciprocal ones inhering in John; Third, there is only one
truthmaking quality inhering in something external to John, and existentially
depending on it. This is the case of so-called Cambridge properties [5], like being
loved by Mary. To include the last two cases, we refine our definition as follows:
a property P is descriptive iff, for every x, P(x) holds in virtue of (at least) a
quality q being existentially dependent on x.
Intrinsic properties. The notion of intrinsic property is well-established in
philosophy, despite some debate on precise definitions holding for arbitrary prop-
erties [19]. We shall say that a property holding for x is extrinsic iff it requires
the existence of something else external to x in order to hold (where external
is defined as in footnote 6), and intrinsic otherwise. The intrinsic/extrinsic dis-
tinction turns out to be orthogonal to the descriptive/non-descriptive one, and
each of the four combinations has its own peculiarities in terms of TMs.
Being red and being married are examples of, respectively, intrinsic descrip-
tive and extrinsic descriptive properties. In the former case the minimal weak
TM is a non-relational quality, in the latter it is a relational quality. Being
an apple or having a nose are examples of intrinsic non-descriptive properties,
whose argument coincides with the minimal weak TM. Being proper part of a
car and being Italian are examples of extrinsic non-descriptive properties. The
minimal weak TM for the former is a car, while the one for the latter (which is
an historical property) is a birth event.
2.3 Truthmaking patterns for properties
Let us now discuss the practical impact of the above considerations on reification
choices concerning properties, commenting the truthmaking patterns (TMPs for
short) that emerge once we decide to put TMs in the domain of discourse.
For the sake of space, we discuss here only two of the four combinations of
descriptive/non-descriptive and intrinsic/extrinsic properties mentioned above,
since no reification is necessary for intrinsic non-descriptive properties (their
weak TM being already present in the domain of discourse), while the case of
6extrinsic descriptive properties is very similar to that of external descriptive
relations which we shall discuss later. We shall introduce three broad classes of
patterns: partial TMPs, in turn distinguished in strong or weak, depending on
the kind of TMs reified, and full TMPs including both strong and weak TMs
as well as the relationship between them. All the patterns will be discussed by
means of examples.
Intrinsic descriptive properties. Note that these properties do rarely corre-
spond to classes, because they do not carry a principle of identity [13,14]. So,
the property of being red for a rose is typically expressed as an attribute-value
pair within the class Rose (Fig. 1a)7, where the attribute name implicitly de-
notes the color quality [8]. We have three reification options, corresponding to
different TMPs. A weak TMP emerges when the quality is reified as a separate
class (Fig. 1b). Note the 1-1 cardinality constraint, showing that a quality in-
heres in exactly one object, and an object has exactly one quality of a given
kind. A strong TMP is exemplified in Fig. 1c, where an event of “color occur-
rence” is reified. The first option is generally more flexible, making it possible
to describe the way the quality interacts with the world (Mary likes the color of
this rose), or further information about the quality itself (the color of a rose is
located in its corolla). The second option is however necessary when we need to
account for temporal information (e.g., how long the redness lasted), or for the
spatiotemporal context (what happened meanwhile and where...).
To achieve the maximum expressivity, a third option is that of a full TMP,
including both strong and weak TMs plus the relationship among them (Fig. 1d).
Concerning the latter, note that there is a formal ontological connection between
qualities and events, discussed in [10]: events can be seen as manifestations of
qualities, and qualities as the focus of events.
Fig. 1. Truthmaking patterns for an intrinsic descriptive property.
Extrinsic non-descriptive properties. For those of them that are anti-rigid,
it certainly makes sense to reify the event during which they hold, i.e., their
strong TM. For example, a strong TMP applied to the class InstalledCarPart
(Fig. 2a) would include the class CarPartInstalled (Fig. 2b), which denotes the
7 For clarity purposes, all models here are represented in OntoUML [14]. No commit-
ment on OntoUML is however assumed.
7state of having that part installed. A weak TMP that includes the car itself as
a weak TM is exemplified in Fig. 2c8. The full TMP is shown in (Fig. 2d).
Fig. 2. Truthmaking patterns for a non-descriptive property.
3 Relations and their TMs
In his early work, Guizzardi borrowed from [16] a crisp distinction between
formal and material relations, describing the former as holding between two
or more entities “directly without any further intervening individual” [14, p.
236], and the latter as requiring the existence of an intervening individual. His
modeling proposal was to systematically introduce—for all material relations—a
specific construct, called the relator, standing for such intervening individual.
In the philosophical literature, the formal/material distinction varies signif-
icantly among different authors both in content and terminology, and overlaps
with other distinctions. In the following, building on recent work [9,10], we shall
revise these distinctions in the light of TMs analysis, aiming at clarifying some
conceptual and terminological problems which resulted in some confusions and
inconsistencies in the way the relator construct was used in the past [11]. We
shall discuss here three orthogonal distinctions, presented in compact form in
Fig. 3: internal/external, essential/contingent, and descriptive/non-descriptive.
3.1 Kinds of relationships
The formal/material distinction defined above overlaps with two main distinc-
tions proposed in the literature: internal/external and essential/contingent. They
both originate from a core idea of internal relations as holding only in virtue of
the ‘internal nature’ of their relata. However, different definitions have been
proposed depending on how such nature is understood [18]. A first definition,
due to Moore [21], says that a relation is internal iff it necessarily holds just
in virtue of the mere existence of its relata, i.e., it is essential to its relata. A
second definition, originally due to Russell [27], says that a relation is internal
iff it is definable in terms of the intrinsic properties of its relata, and external
8 The choice of reifying a weak TM only arises for those non-descriptive properties
whose minimal weak TM does not coincide with their argument. In such cases, the
weak TM is typically an argument’s proper part (say, a nose for having a nose) or
something that includes the argument as a proper part.
8otherwise. We shall adopt Russel’s definition for internal/external, using essen-
tial/contingent for the distinction based on Moore’s definition. Note that using
both distinctions in the same classification framework forces us to adopt a fine
granularity, classifying relationships and not relations, since, as we shall see,
it is possible that, within the same relation, some individual relationships are
essential and others are contingent.
Fig. 3. Kinds of relationships (revised from [10]).
Let us see now how Guizzardi’s formal/material distinction, which is cru-
cial for his notion of relator, is mapped to the two definitions above. In his
book [14, p. 236], he pointed explicitly to Moore essential/contingent distinction
while talking of formal relations, but, in retrospective, what he actually had in
mind was more in line with Russel’s internal/external distinction, since he in-
cluded within formal relations also comparative relations like taller than, which
is not essential as it does not necessarilyt hold when the relata exist. For him, a
material relation holds in virtue of the existence of a relator composed of partic-
ularized properties called modes (qualities according to our analysis) that inhere
in the relata and are historically dependent on a common external foundation
(an event). The typical example he makes is that of a marriage relationship,
whose relator (the marriage itself) is composed of modes (mutual commitments
and claims between the spouses) existentially dependent on a common founda-
tion (a wedding event). So, Guizzardi’s ‘material’ is narrower than ‘external’,
and, since the formal/material distinction is exhaustive, his ‘formal’ turns out
to be broader than ‘internal’.
Let us now go back to the main reason for the formal/material distinction
in conceptual modeling, which is deciding whether or not a relationship can
be reified. In a recent paper [10], Guarino and Guizzardi showed that none
of the distinctions considered so far (essential/contingent, internal/external9,
9 In the original paper [10], we labeled this distinction ‘intrinsic/extrinsic’, aiming
at extending to relations the terminology adopted for properties. However, in the
philosophical literature ‘external relation’ is not synonym of ‘extrinsic relation’, since
the latter requires the existence of something completely external to the relata.
9formal/material) can help in this decision. Their analysis was mainly motivated
by the confusing behavior of comparative relations. They were considered as
formal by Guizzardi, and therefore not deserving reification. However, there may
be good reasons to talk about them [9]: for instance, one may want to keep track
of the difference in height between a mother and her son, or of the temperature
difference between two bodies. So, comparative relations seem to share something
in common with other relations that deserve to be reified, although it is difficult
to characterize them in terms of the distictions considered so far.
On one hand, as observed by Simons [28], within comparative relations some
individual relationships are essential, but others are contingent. For instance,
the mere existence of an electron e and a proton p is enough to conclude that
heavier(p, e) holds (since both of them have their mass essentially), but the mere
existence of John and Mary is not enough to conclude that taller(John,Mary)
holds, since they do not have that particular height essentially. Moreover, even
within the same relation, some individual relationships (like heavier(p,e)) may
be essential, while others (like heavier(John,Mary)) may be just contingent.
On the other hand, although all comparative relations are internal (since they
are definable in terms of the intrinsic properties of their relata), those among
objects or events hold in virtue of the qualities of their relata, while those among
qualities (e.g., perfect resemblance) hold in virtue of the relata themselves, so
they don’t deserve reification (otherwise we would have an infinite regress). In
conclusion, the distinctions mentioned so far are not able to discriminate between
reifiable and non-reifiable relations.
3.2 Descriptive Relations and Relators
Analogously to the case of descriptive properties, we define a descriptive relation
as a relation that holds in virtue of some qualities that are existentially dependent
on one or both its relata. The mereological sum of such qualities forms what we
call a relator, which (recalling the discussion in Section 2) is therefore the min-
imal weak TM of the relation. As Fig. 3 shows, the descriptive/non-descriptive
distinction is orthogonal to those discussed so far. So, there are descriptive rela-
tions that are internal (such as comparative relations among objects or events),
and others that are external (those originally called material relations by Guiz-
zardi). The relators in these two cases, however, are very different. Since internal
relations are defined as derivable from intrinsic properties of their relata, the re-
lators of internal descriptive relations are just formed of qualities depending only
on the relatum they inhere in. On the contrary, relators of external descriptive
relations include at least some qualities that, besides depending on the relatum
they inhere in, are also depending on the other relatum. The latter is the notion
of relator discussed in Guizzardi’s thesis, which was generalized and simplified
in a previous paper [10], in order to work for all kinds of descriptive relations,
and here has been analysed in terms of truthmaking. The link between a rela-
tor and its relata was originally called ‘mediation’, but recently we decided to
adopt a more neutral term, ‘involvement’. An entity is involved in a descriptive
relationship, reified as a relator, if one of its qualities is part of such relator.
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Having relators (i.e., reified relationships) in the domain of discourse has
been recognized as a solution to many practical problems in conceptual mod-
eling, including disambiguation of cardinality constraints, transitivity of part-
whole relations, and proper modeling of anadic relations, among many others
[14]. Moreover, having relators as full-fledged endurants (being them bundles of
qualities, which are endurants themselves) allows us to describe their behavior
in time exactly like an object [9]. So, for example, relators can undergo differ-
ent phases, have essential and accidental qualities of their own, and change in a
qualitative way while remaining the same.
3.3 Truthmaking patterns for relations
Similarly to the case of properties, let us now discuss the reification options and
the corresponding TMPs concerning relations. We shall only consider quadrants
2, 3 and 4 of Fig. 3, since the TMs of relationships in quadrant 1 are their own
arguments, so that no further reification is necessary.
Internal descriptive relations. The main representatives of this class are
comparative relations among objects or events. A first option is to reify their
weak TM, i.e., their relator, composed of exactly two qualities of the same kind.
For example, for the heavier-than relation, the relator is the class WeightRela-
tionship shown in (Fig. 4b).
Fig. 4. Applying weak and strong truthmaking patterns to comparative relations.
Note that, since relators are weak TMs, multiple relations can be derived
from the same relator, depending on the actual values of the qualities compos-
ing the relator. Consider for instance Fig. 4b. Since it is a weight comparison
relationship, one could also derive relations such as lighter-than, same-weight-
as, twice-as-heavy, and so on. In a sense, the relator generalizes the relation,
maintaining the possibility to represent all the relevant cases by means of the
qualities. Moreover, reifying the relator helps when one wants to make explicit
which qualities ground the relation (e.g. heavier-than is derived from a compar-
ison of weights). As discussed in depth in [14], explicitly acknowledging from
which qualities a comparative relation is derived allows us to also account for
the specific meta-properties on that relation. For example, heavier-than is a total
order relation because it is founded on weight qualities, which take their values
(qualia) in a linear (i.e., totally ordered) weight space.
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Fig. 4c shows the addition of a strong truhmaker to the previous case, which
achieves the maximum expressivity. Adding the WeightImbalance event (which
is actually a state, i.e., a static event) allows us to capture more explicitly the
state of affairs corresponding to a heavier-than relationship, and specify as well
details concerning its actual duration its spatiotemporal context.
External descriptive relations hold in virtue of at least one relational quality
inhering in at least one relatum. We distinguish two main cases: single-sided
relations holding in virtue of one or more qualities inhering in just one relatum,
and multi-sided relations holding in virtue of at least two qualities each inhering
in a different relatum. An example of the first kind is an attitudinal relation
such as desires, represented in Fig. 5a. A weak TMP is shown in Fig. 5b, where
a desire quality inhering in an agent and depending on some resources is reified.
Note that we have represented it as a quality, but it could be seen as as well as
a relator consisting of just one quality. The addition of a strong TM, resulting
in a full TMP, is shown in Fig. 5c. The event labeled ‘DesireEvolution’ describes
whatever happens in reality whose focus is that particular desire, such as the
arising of the desire and its satisfaction.
Fig. 5. Weak and full truthmaking patterns for a single-sided relation.
Multi-sided relations are arguably the most frequent case of external descrip-
tive relations. Reifying their TMs is often necessary to model social and legal
relationships, such as marriages, economic contracts, employment relationships,
and so on. An example of full TMP is presented in Fig. 6, which describes
a subscribes relation holding between service providers and service customers.
The relator is shown as a contractual relationship consisting of reciprocal com-
mitments and claims inhering in the customer or the supplier (and externally
dependent on each other).
Note that, just by explicitly representing the contract, this model clarifies
the cardinalities of the subscribes relation. Here we assume that contracts are
always bilateral, i.e., a contract involves exactly one customer and one provider.
Thus, this pattern rules out the possibility of multi-party contracts that could
be inferred otherwise. This is an example of how the explicit representation of
relators can eliminate the aforementioned problem of cardinalities ambiguity.
The pattern described by Fig. 6 may also be applied to role-playing relations
such as president-of between a person and an organization. In this case the rela-
tor accounts for the social commitments and obligations related to the particular
role, while the event accounts for the period of time when the role is played. So,
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Fig. 6. The full truthmaking pattern for a service subscribing relation.
this pattern can be seen as the well-founded version of the “time indexed person
role” defined in [7].
External non-descriptive relations. Unlike the cases we have just discussed,
the TMs of these relations are completely external to their relata, in the sense
that they do not inhere in them, are not parts of them and do not partic-
ipate to them (footnote 6). One example is the born-in relation holding be-
tween Tiago and Brazil. If we put on our “detective lenses” to inspect both
Tiago and Brazil, we will not be able to find any quality in virtue of which
the relation holds. The same would happen for other relationships such as
painter(SistineChapel,Michelangelo), or veteran(Jack,VietnamWar). These are
all examples of historical relationships, holding in virtue of an event in the past
in which at least one of the relata participated.
Fig. 7 depicts a pattern in which the TM of the born-in relation, holding
between a Person and a Country, is reified by means of a Birth event. The
reification of TMs for historical relations is particularly useful when one needs
to represent additional properties of these events, such as their duration or the
presence of other participants (e.g. the doctor who assisted a birth). It may also
be useful to do so for properly representing cardinality constraints, similarly to
the case of relators. Finally, if one accepts the classical view that events are
immutable entities [9], differentiating between TMs that are events and TMs
that are endurants allows us to represent these entities’ properties in a way that
properly accounts for this constraint (e.g., in UML, representing all relevant
properties of events as readOnly attributes).
Fig. 7. An application of the historical relation pattern.
Complex truthmaking configurations. In certain cases, the TM is not just a
single entity, like the birth event, but rather a complex truthmaking configuration.
Take for instance the colleague-of relation, between people working in the same
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organization. For this relation, the weak TM is a larger entity of which the two
relata are parts, namely the organization itself, while the strong TM is the actual
event of working for the same organization at the same time, so that the relation
is derived from a particular configuration of data that are external to the relata.
More complex cases of truthmaking configurations have been discussed in [11]
in the context of an ontological analysis of the REA accounting model [20].
Differently from the other cases we discussed in this section, complex truth-
making configurations do not follow a common structural pattern. Still, we pre-
sented them as a separate case to highlight that some relationships may not be
simply reified by means of a single entity, but rather by a complex truthmaking
configuration.
4 Conclusions
Differently from other approaches that look mainly at reification techniques from
the modeling language point of view [3,15,24,25], we have focused in this paper on
understanding the ontological nature of what should be reified, by systematically
investigating why properties and relations hold, and providing guidelines for
reification choices according to the nature of their TMs. A crucial contribution
in this analysis was the recognition of qualities as minimal weak truthmakers,
which turned out to be a very useful application of Parsons’ quite original views.
We also clarified Guizzardi’s distinction between formal and material re-
lations, proposing a new classification of relations based on the orthogonal dis-
tinctions descriptive/non-descriptive and internal/external (a refinement of that
presented in [10] that helped us to develop systematic TMPs aimed at facilitat-
ing the ontological analysis of actual modeling cases. These patterns may be
easily incorporated in conceptual models based on foundational ontologies that
support the notion of individual quality, such as DOLCE [2], UFO [14], or BFO
[1]. In particular, we plan to implement them in the OntoUML [14] language
and in its modelling evironments, such as the Menthor Editor [22], to support
modelers in systematically investigating and representing the TMs of properties
and relations.
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